This paper continues the work of Abeledo and Rothblum, who study nonbipartite stable matching problems from a polyhedral perspective.
INTRODUCTION
In a stable matching problem agents have to be matched in pairs while having strict preferences over their potential mates. The goal is to find a matching where no two agents prefer being matched to each other over their outcomes in the matching, where singlehood is considered worse than being paired with any admissible mate. Gale and Shapley [5] call such a matching stable, since it will remain unchanged if the agents act rationally.
described a polynomial algorithm that computes a stable matching for any given stable marriage problem. A nonbipartite stable matching problem is also known as a stable roommates problem. In this case, Gale and Shapley [S] showed that stable matchings do not always exist. Settling a question raised by Knuth 191 , Irving [7] obtained the first polynomial algorithm that either finds a stable matching, or determines that none exists, for problems where all pairs of agents are matchable. Gusfield and Irving [6] showed how to modify this algorithm to handle arbitrary stable matching problems. Stable matching problems have a wealth of structural properties that have been explored over the past three decades using combinatorial techniques. A new approach for studying stable matching problems was initiated by Vande Vate [15] and Rothblum [13] , who showed, for the stable marriage problem, that a simple system of linear inequalities describes the stable matching polytope, i.e., the convex hull of the incidence vectors of the stable matchings. This result allowed Roth, Rothblum, and Vande Vate [ll] to use linear programming theory to derive known properties of stable marriage problems and to extend these to fractional stable matchings. Abeledo and Rothblum [2] expanded this approach to the general case, where the underlying graph is not necessarily bipartite, by studying properties of the fractional stable matching polytope, which is a relaxation of the stable matching polytope and whose integral vectors are also the incidence vectors of the stable matchings.
In this paper we continue the analysis of stable matching problems from a polyhedral perspective. One of our main results here shows that we can associate with each fractional stable matching a polytope which is a subset of the fractional stable matching polytope and which contains an integral vector if (and only if) the original problem has a stable matching. We then show how to generate, using linear programming, a sequence of fractional stable matchings whose associated polytopes are monotonically decreasing. This procedure stops when it identifies a stable matching or reaches a conclusion that no such matching exists. As linear programming problems can be solved in polynomial time, this procedure yields an alternative polynomial algorithm for solving stable matching problems. We remark, however, that it is not competitive with Irving's from a complexity standpoint.
For further results, applications, and history of stable matching problems, see the books by Gusfield and Irving [6] and Roth and Sotomayor [12] .
PRELIMINARIES

Graphs and Matchings
We shall only be concerned here with finite undirected graphs without loops or multiple edges. For graph theory definitions see, e.g., [3] . Let G = (V, E) be a graph with vertex set V and edge set E. For each o E V, N(u) = (u: (v, U) E E) is the set of neighbors of u.
We will consider vectors r E RE, indexed by the edges of G, such that 0 < x, < 1 for every e E E. We call such vectors half-integral if they belong to (0, k, 1)'. Let x E RE be a nonnegative vector; then the set of edges 
The Stable Matching Problem
We formally define a stable matching problem as a pair (G; P) where G = (V, E) is a graph and P is a mapping on V such that, for each vertex u E V, P(u) is a strict linear order on N(o) U (u) that has c) as its last element. We call G the acceptability graph, P the preference profile, and P(u) the preference of vertex v.
We will usually represent the preference i.e., (u, o) is a blocking pair for p if both vertices prefer being matched to each other over their outcome under p. A matching p is stable if it has no blocking pair. Equivalently, p is a stable matching for (G; P> if the following stability condition holds for each (u, v) E E:
To solve a stable matching problem means to either find a stable matching for the problem or to determine that no such matching exists. 
Basic Definitions and Results
Henceforth, (G; P> denotes a given stable matching problem with graph G = (V, E). We define the stable matching polytope SM(G; P) of the problem (G; P) as the convex hull of the incidence vectors of its stable matchings. We describe below a system of linear inequalities that must be satisfied by all vectors in SM(G; P). 
C x,,,~ + C x,,,~ +x,,,:
where i >#, v denotes (i E N(u): i >{, v} and j >c u denotes (j E I: j >n u).
We call constraints (4) the stability constraints. Solutions of (21, (3), and (4) are called fractional stable matchings of (G; P). The fractional stable matching polytope is the set of all fractional stable matchings and will be denoted FSM(G; P). The following assertion follows trivially.
Further, [13] . !f G is (I biparfite gruph. then SM(G: P) = FSM(G; P).
The next theorem, proved in [2] , asserts that the fractional stable matching polytope is always nonempt>, and establishes the half-integrality of its extreme points.
In particular, as SM(G; P) is empty when (G: P) has no stable matching.
the above result shows that the inequalities (2), (31, and (4) 
Extended Suppotis of Fractional Stable Matchings
E+(x) G T(x). (9)
Further, if x is the incidence vector of a stable matching /J, then _a,(~) = C,(v) = p(z)) for every o E V, and T(x) = /.L.
The next lemma characterizes the set of edges that are not in the extended support of a given fractional stable matching.
LEMMA 3.10. Let x E FSMCG; P). Then {u, v} E E \ T(x) if and only ifu cc gx(u) o?-2) -cu VJU).
Proof. The "if" part of the lemma follows from the definition of T(x) in (8). To prove the "only if" part, let {u, u} E E \ T(x) and assume to the contrary that u a0 _-x u (u) and u au _a,(~). As {u, U} E T(x), the definition of T(x) in (8) implies that at least one of the two inequalities u >. C%,(U) and v >,, ZX;(u> is met. Without loss of generality, assume that u >c i?,(u). Then cj>,~ "0,j = 0. Now, if u E V" then C, + x,,, i = Ci E Ncu) x,, i = 0. If, alternatively, u E V1, then the assumption that o au crX(u> implies that Ci>,fi x,,~ < I -x,~,~,(~) < 1. In either case, Xi>," x,,~ + C,,, xo.j + x U,D < 1. So x does not satisfy (4) a contradiction to our assumption.
??
Given x: E FSM(G; P), Lemma 3.10 implies the following representation of T(x)
T(x) = {(u,w} E E:u~~(v) + u and gX(u) <U 0).
We note that in [2] , the extended support of a fractional stable matching is defined by (10) . This equality shows that the two definitions are equivalent.
3.3.
Problem Reduction In this subsection we define for each fractional stable matching x a polytope, denoted FSM,,,, (G; P), that consists of the fractional stable matchings whose support is included in T(X). Our main result here shows how to use a given stable matching p and a fractional stable matching x to compute a stable matching /J' for (G; P) whose incidence vector is in FSM,(,,(G; I').
As an immediate consequence of this result we conclude that FSM(G; P) has an integral point if and only if FSM,(,,(G; P) has one. Thus, given any fractional stable matching X, solving (G; P) is equivalent to determining whether the polytope FSM,,,, (G; P) has an integral point. This property is essential for the algorithm we develop in the next section, where it will be combined with a procedure for generating a decreasing sequence of such polytopes, each strictly contained in the previous one, and each of them containing an integer point if and only if the original FSM(G; I') has one.
We begin by introducing some additional notation. Given a set of edges T c E, we denote by FSM,(G; P) the polytope defined by (2) (3) (4) 
Let x E FSM(G; P), and as'sume p is a stable matching fiw (G; P). Define the mapping CL' from V into it.selfby
Then p' is a stable matching for (G; P), and its incidence vector i.s ill FSM,,*,(G; P).
Proof.
Let y denote the incidence vector of p. We first prove that the mapping /.L' represents a matching. It has to be shown that P'(U) = u if and only if p'(u) = U. Let 6 E V and set u = P'(U). Note that for all three cases of (12), {u, c) is a fractional stable pair. We consider each case separately: (ii> p'(u) E {_a,(~), E.L(u)] and p'(u) E {_a,(~), p(u)]: In this case (12) implies that p'(u) aa p(u) and p'(u) ail p(u). Hence,
In particular,
where the last inequality holds because y E FSM(G; I').
We have seen that z satisfies (21, (3), (4), and (11) . Hence z f FSM,,,,(G; P) and, as z is integral, it is a stable matching for (G; I').
??
The next corollary follows immediately from Theorem 3.11 and is the key to our algorithm. COROLLARY 3.12. Let x E FSM(G; P). Then (G; P) has a stable matching if and only if it has one whose incidence vector is in FSM,(,,(G; P).
THE ALGORITHM
In this section we describe a polynomial procedure for solving stable matching problems. Our procedure uses linear programming to generate a finite sequence of fractional stable matchings that converges to the incidence vector of a stable matching, when such a matching exists. As linear programming is solvable in polynomial time (see, e.g., Schrijver [I4]), we are able to obtain an algorithm for the stable matching problem with polynomial complexity.
For given T c E and {u, V] E T, we consider the linear programs m={y,,,: Y E FSM,(G; P)) min{y,,,: y E FSM,(G; P)}.
We represent optimal solutions to the above linear programs by y + and y -, respectively. As T and {u, u} will always be identified by the context, no confusion will arise with this notation. We remark that these linear programs do not necessarily have unique optimal solutions.
Our algorithm solves the stable matching problem (G; P) by iteratively solving a sequence of linear programs of the above type. The following results are used to establish the correctness of this procedure.
LEMMA 4.1. Let x E FSM(G; P) nnd y E FSM,.,,,(G:
Then T(y) c T(x).
Proof.
As y satisfies (11) Further, {u, a,(u)} E T(x) \ T(y+), implying that T(y+) c T(x). We now consider when yU;O = 0. We recall that by Lemma 3.8, z! = a,(u). Since, by Lemma 4.1, T(y-) c T(x), we conchide that Ts;,-(u) <U a,(u) = U. Thus, as {u, 2;) E T( y-), we conclude that I'( y-) c T(x). Finally, if ylzI, < 1 and yUyl, > 0 then 0 < yU,, < 1, for all y E FSM,(,,(G; I'). Hence there is no stable matching for (G; P) w h ose incidence vector is in FSM,(G; P), and by Corollary 3.12, (G; P) has no stable matching.
THE ALGOKITHM. The algorithm terminates after at most 1 El iterations, either with a stable matching p for (G; P) or with the conclusion that none exists.
Proof.
Termination of this algorithm is guaranteed, since as long as neither of the two termination criteria is met, parts (a) and (b) of Lemma 4.2 imply that the algorithm generates a sequence of fractional matchings whose extended supports have monotonically decreasing cardinality. As IT(x)1 < I El for each x E FSM(G; P) and, in particular, for the initial fractional stable matching, it follows that the algorithm must stop after at most IEl iterations.
Assume now that at termination the first criterion [E+(x) = E,(x)] is met, and let x be the final fractional stable matching. Then by Lemma 3.1, x is the incidence vector of a stable matching for (G; P). Further, by the definition of T(x) it is clear that I_L = T(x) is the matching whose incidence vector is x.
Finally, if the alternative termination criterion is met ( yU:l. < 1 and yt~ 1: > O), part (c) of Lemma 4.2 asserts that no stable matching exists. W Since the initial fractional stable matching x can be found by solving a single linear program and each iteration requires solving at most two linear programs, this algorithm yields a method that solves a stable matching problem (G; P) by solving at most 2) El + 1 linear programs.
